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Given how the Balco case developed and was uncovered perhaps what is needed is less money put into developing tests and more money put into rewards for ratting on suppliers. It seems like it would require a significant number of clients to finance the development of these new drugs, if there were a significant financial reward for ratting it might be difficult to successfully spread the word that you have a product without getting ratted out.
That could be a way indirectly to reach Nash equilibrium, the game theory in the Sci Am article I cited in an NSR thread: payoff for playing clean (and ratting on supplier) is at least equal to (or better than) payoff for playing doped (and going down in flames with ratted-on supplier). Assumption is that players start clean and don't see a better payoff by going over to the dark side. The Nash equilibrium could be achieved by linking players' fates to suppliers' fates. Interesting.
Think I'll look up the author of the article.
Regards, VB
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Given how the Balco case developed and was uncovered perhaps what is needed is less money put into developing tests and more money put into rewards for ratting on suppliers. It seems like it would require a significant number of clients to finance the development of these new drugs, if there were a significant financial reward for ratting it might be difficult to successfully spread the word that you have a product without getting ratted out.
That could be a way indirectly to reach Nash equilibrium, the game theory in the Sci Am article I cited in an NSR thread: payoff for playing clean (and ratting on supplier) is at least equal to (or better than) payoff for playing doped (and going down in flames with ratted-on supplier). Assumption is that players start clean and don't see a better payoff by going over to the dark side. The Nash equilibrium could be achieved by linking players' fates to suppliers' fates. Interesting.
Think I'll look up the author of the article.
Regards, VB
